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With the dramatic increase in working from home due to the COVID-19 situation, 
the reliance on online collaborative sessions has increased manifold and there is a 
significant need to have an enhanced immersive sharing and collaborative experience in 
live meetings.  Existing sharing and collaboration mechanisms (including the sharing of 
meeting presentations ahead of time, etc.) all suffer from different weaknesses.  To address 
these types of challenges, techniques are presented herein that support a means whereby, 
among other things, an authorized participant in an online meeting may request (through, 
for example, clicking on a shared meeting screen, using a voice input, etc.) that the meeting 
system, on demand, provide access to additional meeting content such as, for example, 




With the dramatic increase in working from home due to the COVID-19 situation, 
the reliance on online collaborative sessions has increased manifold and there is a 
significant need to have an enhanced immersive sharing and collaborative experience in 
live meetings.  For example, one of the common challenges in live meetings where a 
presenter is sharing content is to get on-demand access to some of the content being shared 
or obtain additional information (such as, for example, metadata) about the content that can 
help the non-presenter audience to develop more clarity, to browse links, etc. 
The existing means to solve these problems include sharing the meeting 
presentation ahead of time to all participants thereby allowing other audience members on 
the bridge to use the material offline and fetch additional content, browse links, etc. or to 
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share content on demand through a meeting chat window or an external real time 
collaboration client (such as, for example, an Internet Messaging Program (IMP) client). 
The problem is more relevant in meetings where the meeting material cannot be 
shared with the audience ahead of time or the meeting material content cannot be shared at 
all.  Examples of such circumstances may include, possibly among other things, a 
company's financial review meeting, board meetings, or similar highly confidential 
discussion-oriented conferences. 
Use cases illustrating aspects of the above may include, for example: 
1. Online University lectures.  In a university lecture session, a professor may 
employ several dynamic pieces of content in his lecture.  He may use a terminal 
or an integrated development environment (IDE) to demonstrate a code 
example.  He may open a web browser and show an Application Programming 
Interface (API) definition.  Additionally, predefined presentation slides, etc. 
may be utilized.  Thus, sharing ahead of time may not help in such contexts. 
2. Collaborative teams.  During any brainstorming session within teams, one 
person may share his screen and go through various links or documents.  Other 
team members can simply fetch that data in real-time without interrupting the 
presenter and can continue the research further at their respective ends. 
3. Board meetings.  In a typical financial or board meeting, the presenter reveals 
some information live.  Such information cannot be shared ahead of time with 
the participants, which in turn will defeat the purpose of such meetings. 
4. Confidential content in slides.  There may be some confidential content (e.g., 
links, etc.) in slides that are meant to be shared just within a particular group of 
people (e.g., individuals within the same company). The sharing of such data 
ahead of time will defeat the purpose and give access to everyone. 
5. Better interview experience and live sessions.  Frequently during an interview, 
the interviewee needs to request a question, or during a live class the students 
need to request an assignment.  A media server may be pre-fed with such 
information before a meeting starts so that there are no hiccups during the 
interview or during the live sessions. 
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To address the types of challenges that were described above, techniques are 
presented herein that support a means whereby, among other things, an authorized 
participant in an online meeting may request (through, for example, clicking on the shared 
meeting screen, using a voice input, etc.) that the meeting system, on demand, provide 
access to additional meeting content such as, for example, links, images, etc. 
Figure 1, below, provides a high-level depiction of aspects of the techniques that 










Figure 1: High Level Overview 
 
Through aspects of the techniques presented herein, the functionality of a web 
service may be added to online meeting screen shares.  To aid in the description of various 
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of the techniques that are presented herein, a series of exemplary steps will be illustrated 
and described in the narrative below.  Note that, in the discussion below, the first step 
through the ninth step focus primarily on a mechanism to serve real-time content requests 
(e.g., online meeting screen share as a web service) whereas the final step, step ten, extends 
the described mechanism to include pre-fed content sharing. 
Under a first step, during a screen sharing session an option may be provided to a 
presenter inquiring whether he wants to enable uninterrupted content sharing.  If the 
presenter allows such sharing then remote users may be provided with a range of options 
for the different kinds of data that they may request. Different data types may include, for 
example: 
 Generic data types such as, among other things, phone numbers, email 
addresses, hyperlinks, raw text, images, etc. 
 Custom data types which have been pre-fed to the online meeting server by a 
host prior to a meeting.  One possible example might be: 
o Question 1 (From interview perspective) 
o Assignment 1 (From Live-Class perspective) 
o Image Diagram 1 (Generic use-case). 
A second step supports the circumstance where a user makes a request for a 
hyperlink.  First, the participant may send a Session Traversal Utilities for network address 
translation (NAT), or STUN, bind request (that is multiplexed along with a Datagram 
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) - Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) stream) to the 
presenter for content request authorization. 
The participant device meeting client that is requesting the content from a share 
may insert a new STUN attribute that will carry the sender’s and the recipient’s universally 
unique identifier (UUID) (e.g., a participant Address-of-Record (AoR) or other unique 
identifier) and the synchronization source (SSRC) of the participant to whom the STUN 
request needs to be routed.  The UUID (e.g., an AoR or other identifier) of the participant 
may be obtained through a conference package subscription (as described, for example, 
under the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 4575. 
The sender participant also encrypts their UUID along with the requested content 
type using end-to-end (E2E) encryption keys so that only the presenter participant device 
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may decrypt the information.  Note that E2E keys are shared only with participants, and a 
Media Distribution Device (MDD) or the cloud will not have access to same.   
Figure 2, below, depicts elements of a new attribute (e.g., X-XYZCORP-
REQUEST-CONTENT-TOKEN) that may support aspects of the above narrative. 
 
 
Figure 2: Exemplary New Attribute 
 
The MESSAGE-INTEGRITY will be computed using a hop-by-hop (HBH) key so 
that the MDD can validate and then forward the message to the presenter participant’s 
device.  A STUN packet will likely be multiplexed along with DTLS-SRTP packets.  The 
MDD will route the STUN packet on the media channel that corresponds to the SSRC to 
only the indicated recipient UUID participant. 
A third step supports various access control policies.  In an online meeting, there 
may be participants from various organizations and the presenter may not want all of the 
participants to access of all the content that he is remotely sharing.  The presenter in this 
step may determine various access control policies when he begins the meeting.  
Exemplary policies may include: 
 
 Policy 1.  Allow access to all data to XYZCorp.com employees. 
 Policy 2.  Allow access to links only to non-XYZCorp.com employees who are 
subject to confidentiality or data protection checks. 
 
For Policy 2, it is possible to perform two sub-policies: 
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 A) Have the XYZCorp data protection or confidentiality module decide 
whether or not the data is confidential.  Multiple mechanisms are available that 
support determining whether or not a given data is confidential. 
 B) Have the presenter only choose signatures which he feels are confidential. 
For example, "opengrok.XYZCorp.com" and "doccentral.XYZCorp.com" may 
be confidential according to the presenter. 
 
It is important to note that while the above example focuses on links, the underlying 
concepts are not limited just to links.  For example, a presenter may even select write 
signatures for anything (e.g., diagrams, shapes, text, etc.), even an entire slide, and mark 
them as confidential. 
During a fourth step, based on the policies that were defined by a presenter the 
online meeting server may categorize the incoming STUN requests, based on the access 
control policies defined by the presenter, and generate a unique cookie (that is specific to 
the defined policies) which will then be served in the STUN bind responses. 
For instance, a STUN bind request coming from XYZCorp employees (which will 
have a UUID that identifies the participant uniquely like, for example, a CEC or SIP, an 
AoR, etc.) will match Policy 1. The presenter device may optionally prompt the presenter 
to authorize this access or if the presenter has already preauthorized, the device may simply 
proceed and generate a STUN bind response 
The presenter participant device may generate a unique cookie that will be 
encrypted using an E2E key along with a content type and a nonce in a new attribute.  
Figure 3, below, depicts elements of such an attribute (e.g., X-XYZCORP--CONTENT-
TOKEN-VALUE) that may support aspects of the above narrative. 
 
 
Figure 3: Exemplary New Attribute 
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The sender UUID may be fetched from a bind request (after decrypting the 
encrypted portion using E2E keys) and this may be inserted as a recipient UUID in a bind 
response.  The cookie is generated using policies that are defined to help a content service 
fetch the right material and give it back to the requestor who has the cookie.  The cookie, 
along with the nonce received in the request, and the sender UUID (here presenters) will 
all be encrypted using an E2E key such that only other participants who receive this can 
decrypt the information. 
It is important to note that in conference solutions where a single shared key is used 
across all participants as an E2E key, this STUN bind request/response may use a public 
and private key pair for exchanging this data between a presenter participant and recipient 
participants.  
Under a fifth step, the participant's meeting clients must have received their 
corresponding STUN bind responses along with the unique cookie.  All of the 
corresponding data or content fetch requests must make use of the unique cookie.  Without 
the unique cookie, the presenter meeting client will not serve any requests. 
During a sixth step, one of the participants may issue a request to the presenter for 
the links that are currently displayed on the screen that the presenter is sharing.  
Accordingly, the participant's meeting client will generate a Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) GET request over QUIC or Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a request type of 
hyperlink.  This request will be sent directly to media server.  For example: 
HTTP GET OnlineMtg.XYZCorp.com/content_request/content_type=hyperlink 
x-xyzcorp-content-cookie: XXXX  
x-content-type: hyperlink  
Accept: */*  
User-Agent: Online Meeting Client v1.5  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br 
 
In the above: 
 x-xyzcorp-content-cookie identifies the cookie which was served by the 
presenter in a STUN bind response based on the access control policies. 
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 x-content-type contains the requested content type.  In the above example, the 
participant is requesting all of the hyperlinks that are present on the current 
shared screen. 
 
From a user experience perspective, there may be a number of ways that a 
participant can request content.  For example: 
 The participant can employ a left mouse click on his screen and select the 
content option that he is looking for. 
 The participant can also just speak and say "hey online meeting, fetch me the 
links."  The online meeting server may employ speech-to-text processing, 
which may further trigger various representational state transfer (REST) API 
calls. 
 
During a seventh step, for this particular session the media server will be notified 
by the meeting client that the presenter in this session has indicated that the uninterrupted 
content sharing mode is on.  As depicted in Figure 4, below, this basically means that the 




Figure 4: Illustrative Content Sharing Enablement 
 
9
Defensive Publications Series, Art. 4149 [2021]
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/4149
 9 6613 
As a cache manager, the media server will maintain a map of key-value pairs along 
with an isStale tag.  In a key-value pair the key will be the encrypted request type and the 
value will be the data that was provided by the presenter's online meeting client which will 
also be in encrypted form.  An isStale tag will indicate whether the data is fresh or stale. 
The cache manager may be implemented as an in-memory database for fast access 
and may include details, as shown in Table 1, below, for a particular online meeting session. 
TABLE 1: Example Cache Manager Database Information 
 
 
Various information, as shown in Table 1, may include: 
 Content-type information, which is the content type requested by the participant. 
 Cookie information, which is the unique identifier that was served as an access-
control mechanism during a STUN bind response. 
 A Boolean value 'isStale', which determines whether or not the content is still 
valid.  It may be possible that the presenter has moved to a different screen, then 
the isStale value will be True.  The isStale value will stay False as long as the 
presenter has not changed his screen, slides, etc. 
 Data, which identifies the data that is stored in the meeting server, encrypted 
with E2E keys so that no one in the middle may interfere with or get access to 
the data. E2E keys will be negotiated for the DTLS transmission amongst 
participants and the presenter for the actual media and the same key will be used 
to also encrypt the content. 
 
An eighth step supports the circumstance where a media server receives a request 
from a remote user.  Three scenarios that may be possible under this step will be presented 
and discussed below.  For simplicity, in the below scenarios the following abbreviations 
are employed: 
 A.  The presenter’s online meeting client. 
 B.  A remote user’s or requestor’s online meeting client. 
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 E2E Key.  The key that is used for the media over a DTLS communication link 
between the presenter and the participants. 
 P2P Key.  The key that will be used by participants and the presenter to 
communicate with the meeting server in their respective legs.  It is important to 
note that this key will be unique to each leg. 
 Cathy.  An online meeting participant. 
 
Note that, in general, in any data that is conveyed from a presenter to a participant 
and vice versa (e.g., a STUN bind) the content will be encrypted using an E2E key.   
Whereas in a HTTP GET request from a participant, notifications from the presenter would 
be encrypted using a P2P key. 
Under a first scenario, consider that the media server does not have the requested 
key.  In this case, the media server will forward the request to 'A' by encrypting it using the 
P2P key and 'A' will decrypt the request and understand the kind of request initiated by 'B'.  
Next, 'A' will then perform an optical character recognition (OCR) operation on the current 
frame being shared in the meeting (using one or more of the many existing cloud APIs) 
and will fetch the text data that matches the request (in this case hyperlinks).  Next, A' will 
encrypt the data with the E2E key and then send same back to the media server.   
The media server will forward the encrypted data to 'B' and will also save it in its 
dictionary, just in case some other user also asks for the same data until the frame has been 
changed.  Figure 5, below, illustrates aspects of this scenario. 
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Figure 5: Scenario One – Media Server Does Not Have Requested Data 
 
Under a second scenario, the media server has the requested key but the isStale tag 
is True.  This is the case when the media server has already received the data from 'A' but 
the frame has been changed recently thus marking the data as stale.  As depicted in Figure 
6, below, which captures aspects of this scenario, the media server will again have to 
request new data to the media server as in the first scenario. 
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Figure 6: Scenario Two – Media Server has Stale Data 
 
Under a third scenario, the media server has fresh data.  If the media server has an 
entry in its dictionary for the requested key and the isStale tag is not set to True (indicating 
that the data is not stale), then the media server is capable of fulfilling this request without 
any need to query the presenter's online meeting client.  Figure 7, below, illustrates aspects 
of this scenario. 
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Figure 7: Scenario Three – Media Server Has Fresh Data 
 
A ninth step addresses the issue of synchronization.  In the different scenarios that 
were explained in step eight, above, obviously there needs to be a continuous 
synchronization between the presenter and the meeting or media server.  Whenever there 
is be a frame change in the screen, the presenter will initiate a lightweight message (e.g., 
an HTTP PUT request with a flag "isStale") to the media server to indicate that all the 
previous data stored at the media server is now stale.  The media server will need to ask 
for new data from A if it receives any new request after this point (see scenario number 
two under step eight, as described above). 
Events like mouse clicks and keyboard strokes may be considered as the trigger for 
a change of frame and hence initiate the lightweight message to the media server to update 
the isStale tag.  There may be a default set of keystrokes that indicate the change of frame 
but the presenter can modify them during the initial setup of the meeting. The online 
meeting server just needs to listen to such events and trigger the message for updating the 
isStale tag.  Figure 8, below, depicts aspects of the above synchronization discussion. 
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Figure 8: Illustrative Synchronization 
 
An alternate approach may employ voice feeds where the presenter sets the voice 
feedback option in the meeting.  Under this option, the online meeting server can listen to 
key events as specified by the user during his setup (e.g., "moving to the next slide," etc.) 
or the online meeting server can use natural language processing (NLP) to understand the 
context from the extracted text from the presenter's speech (e.g., raw audio speech to 
text  NLP on the extracted text  trigger event).  The presenter may even define a 
combination of keystrokes and voice feeds to denote the trigger for a change of frame. 
15
Defensive Publications Series, Art. 4149 [2021]
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/4149
 15 6613 
It is important to note that the presenter may choose not to define keystrokes.  In 
this case, all the subsequent content requests will need to be served only from the presenter 
meeting client instead of a meeting client's local cache (see scenario number one under step 
eight, as described above). 
A tenth step supports the pre-feeding of content in a screen share.  Before a meeting 
starts, the host of the meeting may feed information in key-value pairs where a key can be 
any string value (such as, for example, "Question 1," "Assignment 1," etc.) and a value can 
be anything (such as, for example, a link, a file, raw text, etc.). 
When a user completes a left click during the meeting, these custom fields will also 
be shown to the presenter which host fed to the online meeting client along with other 
predefined fields like emails, hyperlinks, etc.  Once the host of the meeting gives a voice 
command (e.g., "Ok online meeting, start Question 1") after this point any student can 
request this question.  Before this point a media server will not serve the question. 
For this functionality, a lightweight transaction needs to happen during the start of 
the meeting in which the host's client will POST all of the key-value pairs to the media 
server which in turn will POST just the keys to all of the other clients so that the clients 
would know what data can be requested. 
From a user experience perspective, when a student clicks on their screen they can 
see, for example, "Quiz1: Question1, Question 2, Question 3..."  They can select Qestion1 
but it won't be served unless the host commands such by saying, for example, "start 
question 1" as explained above. 
Of interest and note in connection with the techniques that are presented herein, 
and which were discussed above, are, possibly among other things: 
 On-demand content request during a live session, which may provide the ability 
to retrieve content either through voice-activated trigger options (where the 
participant can just say, for example, "hey online meeting, get me the links from 
the screen") or through a click on the screen. 
 Making an online meeting screen share act as a web service.  One of the key 
elements of the techniques presented herein encompass allowing for the 
dynamic requests of content from a live share, essentially making an online 
16
Dhar et al.: REAL-TIME SECURE SHARING OF LIVE MEETING CONTENT THROUGH VOICE CO
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2021
 16 6613 
meeting screen act as a web service (and make requests for content via GETs) 
in parallel to being a traditional media sharing application. 
 Using STUN for authorization or access control.  More particularly: 
o STUN requests may contain information about the participants in the 
proprietary headers.  There may be a chain of headers that may contain 
information beyond just the UUID of the participants, which may 
depend upon how the online meeting infrastructure is set up by the 
administrator.  STUN packets may be selectively forwarded to presenter 
devices. 
 Tracking of a presenter's screen through voice feedback or keystrokes.  Aspects 
of the techniques presented herein provide a mechanism by which the online 
meeting infrastructure can keep a track of a presenter's screen by monitoring 
keystroke events, or listening to a voice feed from the presenter, or a 
combination of both (as described in step nine, above).  The identified triggers 
may notify the meeting server and create a synchronization between the meeting 
server and the presenter's screen. 
 Cache manager role of a media server.  Data requests may be optimized by, for 
example, the caching of data that is extracted from the OCR output of a real 
time frame which has previously been requested.  This extends the traditional 
functionality of a media or meeting server into a cache manager, aligning the 
entire online meeting infrastructure into a web service. 
In summary, techniques have been presented herein that provide for an authorized 
participant in an online meeting to request (through, for example, clicking on a shared 
meeting screen, using a voice input, etc.) that the meeting system, on demand, provide 
access to additional meeting content such as, for example, links, images, etc. 
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